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Abstract
We model the market for news as a two-sided market where news-
papers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell space to adver-
tisers who value advert-receptive readers. We show that monopolistic
newspapers under-report or bias news that su±ciently reduces adver-
tiser pro¯ts. Newspaper competition generally reduces the impact of
advertising. In fact, as the size of advertising grows, newspapers may
paradoxically reduce advertiser bias, due to increasing competition for
readers. However, advertisers can counter this e®ect of competition by
committing to news-sensitive cut-o® strategies, potentially inducing as
much under-reporting as in the monopoly case.
JEL Classi¯cation: L13; L82.
Keywords: Two-sided markets; advertising; media accuracy; media
bias; media economics.
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Cola sell its products. For a TV commercial's message to get
through, the viewer's brain must be receptive. Our programs
are there to make it receptive, that is to say to divert and relax
viewers between two commercials. What we are selling to Coca-
Cola is human brain time."
Patrick Le Lay, President of TF1 (James, 2004)
1 Introduction
A free and independent press is crucial to the e®ective working of society
and democratic government. According to the ideal market view, uncensored
newspapers compete to attract readers by selling the most accurate news they
can produce. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) point out that newspapers
will bias news if readers prefer bias (e.g., con¯rming personal ideologies) and
they show that newspaper competition cannot prevent such bias. In this
paper, we identify a very di®erent source of bias { advertising { and we
derive a clear, positive role for competition.
We model the market for news as a two-sided market with readers who
value accuracy on one side and advertisers who value access to advert-
receptive readers on the other.1 We develop two main ideas. First, we derive
why advertisers might dislike accurate or in-depth reporting on certain top-
ics; these preferences then lead to inaccuracy in monopolistic markets, but we
prove that newspaper competition can resolve this problem. Paradoxically,
we ¯nd that increased advertising can even improve accuracy by increasing
competition. Second, we show how advertisers can thwart this competitive
e®ect if able to credibly threaten to withdraw their contracts from papers
1See Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2005) and Armstrong (2005) for general treatments of
competition in two-sided markets.
1that report too accurately on sensitive topics.
Advertising is numerically important. Mainstream U.S. newspapers gen-
erally earn over 50 and up to 80% of their revenue from advertising, and
in Europe, this percentage lies between 40 and 50% (see e.g., Baker, 1994,
and Gabszewicz et al., 2001). In the rosiest view, advertising revenue sim-
ply enables newspapers to spend more on producing well-written and accu-
rate news,2 but several media scholars are skeptical (see e.g., Baker, 1994,
Bagdikian, 2000, McChesney, 2000, and Hamilton, 2004). They suggest that
heavy dependence on advertising leads papers to bend news to the interests
of advertisers, generating misrepresentation on some topics and possibly even
a \dumbing-down" of general coverage (as suggested by the above quotation
of Le Lay). To investigate their conjecture, we need to identify advertiser
interests and analyze how they interact with reader interests, in competitive
and monopolistic environments.
In Subsection 2.5 we sketch a microfoundation for advertiser preferences
for under-reporting or bias on sensitive news topics such as the health costs
of smoking. The underlying message (backed by psychological and empirical
evidence) is that news reporting can change the receptiveness of readers
to advertising. There are two channels: ¯rst, reporting a®ects mood and
salient concerns while reading; second, ongoing reporting can change beliefs
and attitudes. In either case, an advertiser's surplus from reaching a given
reader increases with dumbing-down, under-reporting or bias of the sensitive
topics that reduce reader receptiveness to adverts.
One might hope that advertiser pressures would cancel each other out as
advertisers of competing products try to encourage news criticizing compet-
ing products, but competing products are in competition precisely because
they are similar. So many news stories a®ect competing producers in a sim-
ilar way. For instance, a health report that puts people o® smoking harms
tobacco companies altogether.3 Furthermore, advertisers from di®erent mar-
2Advertising also allows readers to learn about consumer products and may even be
enjoyable (see e.g., Baker, 1994, Gabszewicz et al., 2003), but most papers assume a
\nuisance cost" (e.g., Anderson and Coate, 2005).
3Bad publicity for one company can have repercussions for its competitors. For exam-
ple, reports on child labor in Nike sports apparel led to the presumption or discovery that
2kets often share news sensitivities: news on global warming can harm both
energy and car companies; news on famine and deprivation can discourage
thoughts on all personal consumption; news on corporate dishonesty can
make people suspicious of advertising in general;4 critical analysis, in gen-
eral, may make readers more alert and less susceptible to a broad range of
persuasive advertising strategies.
To isolate the role of advertising, we assume that all readers dislike
bias and strictly prefer more accuracy on all topics. Absent advertising, a
monopoly newspaper therefore reports all news accurately (to maximize rev-
enue from readers). Advertising induces under-reporting on any topic that
is su±ciently disliked by enough advertisers and occurs whenever the news
sensitivity of advertiser surplus (whether from a single or many advertisers)
exceeds that of reader surplus.
By contrast, absent advertising, competing newspapers may under-report,
since they seek to soften price competition by segmenting the market for
readers. However, advertising raises the intensity of competition for read-
ers and this eventually precludes market segmentation: newspapers cannot
please advertisers by cutting accuracy, because advertisers care about read-
ership and (when competition is intense) the only way to attract readers is
by maximizing accuracy and minimizing price.5
With competing newspapers, even a single advertiser eventually su®ers
(from increased reporting accuracy) as its importance increases, but this
advertiser \weakness" is overturned if advertisers can in°uence reporting
strategies directly. For instance, Chrysler corporation wrote to the editors of
one hundred papers and magazines where they were advertising:
\In an e®ort to avoid potential con°icts, it is required that Chrysler
corporation be alerted in advance of any and all editorial content
its competitors acted similarly.
4Indeed, Baker (1994) and media monitors (e.g., Media Watch and Fair) claim that
most advertisers shun newspapers that consistently contravene generic norms of \business-
friendliness."
5In Section 6 we analyze the possibility of negative pricing. This neatly complements
and elucidates the logic of our two main results.
3that encompasses sexual, political, social issues or any editorial
content that could be construed as provocative or o®ensive."
Wall Street Journal (April 30, 1997)
Implicitly, Chrysler threatens to withdraw its ad contracts from media that
report too much sensitive news. We model this in Section 5 by allowing each
advertiser to commit to withhold ads from any newspaper that reports above
a chosen threshold or cut-o®. Examples of such practices are relatively abun-
dant and well documented.6;7 Even though we continue to rule out collusion
among advertisers, we ¯nd that advertisers with common news sensitivities
optimally commit to the same thresholds. Furthermore, as advertisers grow
in number or size, they increase the stringency of these demands, eventually
forcing all newspapers to under-report or bias as heavily as in the monopolis-
tic case. This result extends to any actor (e.g., a ¯rm, government or bank)
able to threaten withdrawal of signi¯cant revenue from the paper (whether
by canceling ad contracts, subsidies, group subscriptions or ¯nance).
Our paper is part of a rapidly growing literature. As noted above, Mul-
lainathan and Shleifer (2005) show how (even competing) newspapers bias
news if readers are ideological. Gabszewicz et al. (2001) show how adver-
tising increases the intensity of competition for readers. They also assume
ideological readers, so advertising leads the two papers to converge on news
with a centrist ideology (which they call the \pens¶ ee unique").8 None of the
6 For example, NBC lost its corporate contracts with Coca-Cola in 1970 after airing a
documentary critical of Coca-Cola worker conditions in Florida. As a result, NBC stopped
producing documentaries on \controversial domestic issue[s] involving an important ad-
vertiser" (Brown, 1979). Baker (1994) and Bagdikian (2000) contain further examples.
Baker also points out that actual intervention by advertisers is rare compared to media
self-censorship; this is consistent with our analysis where intervention occurs only out of
equilibrium.
7A recent survey by the Annenberg Center for Public Policy reports that \79% of the
public said they believed a media company that receives substantial advertising revenue
from a company would hesitate to report negative stories about that company" (as cited
in Anderson and McLaren, 2005) and that \33% (of journalists) said that to either a great
extent or a moderate extent, media organizations either intentionally or unintentionally
avoid news stories that are potentially unfavorable to major advertisers."
8Convergence on the centrist ideology prevents conscientious readers from comparing
information from di®erent papers { see Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) for a notion of
aggregate bias.
4papers in this literature allow for news-sensitive advertisers.9 This is why we
¯nd a much stronger (reader) bene¯t from newspaper competition.
Recent analyses extend in other directions. Dyck and Zingales (2003)
suggest that journalists bias news as a way to \thank" their sources for
privileged access to news; Patterson and Donbasch (1996) study journalists'
own biases; Balan et al. (2003) study media mergers when newspaper owners
want to in°uence reader ideology; Anderson and McLaren (2005) analyze
the same issue in a model where readers are fully Bayes rational { both
their microfoundation for why readers value news and their model of bias
by selective news suppression ¯t well with the leading interpretation of our
model of reporting; Baron (2006) considers journalists who seek to have
in°uence; StrÄ omberg (2001 and 2004) and Besley and Prat (2001) integrate
the media into models of electoral competition (complementing our results
on how governments can a®ect reporting); ¯nally, our results also provide
theoretical support for Reuter and Zitzewitz's (2006) empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the general model.
Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 present the main results on monopoly, duopoly, the im-
pact of cut-o® strategies and negative pricing, in the one topic case. Section 7
generalizes to multiple topics and advertiser types, and Section 8 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We study competition between pro¯t-maximizing newspapers in a two-sided
market: newspapers sell news to readers and space to advertisers. We focus
on the content and accuracy of news. To characterize news reporting, we
classify news stories into K topics (e.g., the stock market, the environment,
sports, and health). Each paper chooses how accurately to report news on
each topic: r 2 [0;1]K with rk = 1 if the paper reports fully on topic k
and rk = 0 if it makes no report (or reports uninformatively) on k; see
9This also extends the two-sided markets literature, since we let \platform" design
(newspaper reporting) a®ect the surplus from a given \transaction" between the two sides
(a given ad message to a given reader).
5Subsection 2.5 for background and further interpretation.
2.1 Newspapers
There are N competing newspapers. A typical paper, n, selects its reporting
strategy rn 2 [0;1]K, its copy price charged to readers, pn, and its prices qj
n
for advertising by each type of advertiser, j (i.e., we assume newspapers can
price discriminate among advertisers but not readers). Throughout most
of the paper, we assume copy prices are nonnegative (pn ¸ 0), re°ecting
the perception that it is di±cult for newspapers to force people to read
newspapers and hence ads. However, in Section 6, we brie°y consider the
case where newspapers can set negative copy prices.
2.2 Readers
Readers are interested in news, but vary in their degree of \interest" in each
topic k. There are I reader types, each characterized by a taste vector si 2
[0;1]K where si
k represents i's marginal value of news or increased accuracy
on topic k (e.g., a value from useful information, or a value for knowledge
or entertainment) and a reservation value bi ¸ 0. We assume that readers







provided this maximized value exceeds bi; bi ¸ 0 since we assume no reader
is willing to pay a positive price for a paper with rn = 0. To avoid the
degenerate case where newspapers cannot attract any readers even with zero




i 2 I. There is an equal number (measure 1) of readers of each type, so
denoting reader decisions by the probability xi
n 2 [0;1] that reader i buys or





Advertisers are interested in reaching ad-receptive readers. They care about
how many people read the papers where they advertise. They also care
about the news reporting strategy in these papers, because news a®ects how
readers respond to ads and hence the return to advertising. In 2.5 below, we
present a microeconomic foundation for the following reduced-form utility
of advertisers with an induced distaste for reporting on topics that reduce
readers' ad-receptiveness. Each of J advertiser types is characterized by a

















(see 2.5 for the case (t < 0) where advertisers instead value accuracy). We
assume that these utilities are additively separable across newspapers, so
advertiser j chooses to advertise in paper n (denoted yj
n = 1) if it gives non-
negative utility, and otherwise j chooses not to advertise there (yj
n = 0). To
study variation in the numerical importance of advertising relative to readers,
we assume that there are ®j advertisers of type j. Below we also study an
advertiser size parameter, aj.














This implicitly assumes a trivial marginal cost of reporting and printing for
a newspaper paying the ¯xed costs of maintaining its network of reporters,
editors and news sources; see Baron (2006).10
2.4 Timing
We study the following four stage game (motivated below): In stage 1 news-
papers set their reporting strategies; In stage 2, newspapers set the copy
10For instance, a paper buying access to the bundle of news stories from Reuters or
Associated Press then selects which stories to include and which to exclude. Marginal
costs of increased reporting and accuracy have little substantive impact on our results.
7price charged to readers; In stage 3, readers buy newspapers; In stage 4,
newspapers and advertisers negotiate over advertising prices and quantities.
In each case, all players observe the outcomes of all previous stages before
acting.11 We solve for subgame perfect equilibria. To simplify the exposition,




k ¸ 0; 8j 2 J; this implies that it is always attractive
to advertise in a paper n, even if it reports fully accurately on all topics
(rn;k = 1,8k). We also assume that e±cient bargaining leads to sharing in
a ratio ½ : 1 ¡ ½ between newspapers and advertisers, where ½ 2 (0;1).12
So yj
n = 1;8n;j, and the advertising price is a fraction ½ of the surplus, as
captured in the following lemma.

















and all advertisers buy ads in all papers, yj
n = 1;8j 2 J;n 2 N.
2.5 Interpretation
Reporting strategies (r) are best understood as measures of how newspa-
pers report on average over an extended period of time. So newspapers take
time to build up a reputation for reporting in a certain way. This is why
newspapers set r at stage 1 in the above time ordering (each paper n sets its
reporting strategy rn). One interpretation of r is based on \accuracy". News-
papers can select stories and adjust news presentation to generate bias (see
e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005, for a micromodel in which newspapers
\slant" their reports by selectively suppressing certain types of facts). For
instance, a newspaper might report on the environment whenever a scientist
makes statements suggesting that global warming is minimal, and omit news
11This time ordering is standard. It is only important that r is set in advance - see mo-
tivation below; simultaneity of stages 2, 3 and 4 would slightly complicate the derivations,
but not change our results.
12This sharing rule can readily be derived as the outcome of standard non-cooperative
bargaining. Notice that newspapers compete for readers (who by construction seek at most
one paper), but that advertiser preferences are additively separable across newspapers.
8suggesting global warming is a serious risk. Newspapers can thereby choose
how much to bias reporting in a particular direction (e.g., towards under- or
over- estimation of the risk of global warming). Our model generalizes this
to the multi-dimensional case: we interpret 1 ¡ rk as the degree of bias on
topic k in a particular direction. For instance, with global warming as topic
k, 1 ¡ rk represents the degree to which a paper under-estimates the global
warming risk.13 A second, related, interpretation of r is based on \inten-
sity". Newspapers select the frequency, length, prominence (e.g., frontpage
headline), and persistence with which they report on given topics.
The nature of advertisers' induced preferences is an empirical question.
Here, we sketch a foundation for the above preferences. Advertisers do not
care about news reporting per se, but they do care about the impact of news
on reader behavior. Consider the intensity interpretation of r. Reporting in-
tensity can a®ect reader behavior in two ways, one temporary, the other more
permanent. First, news reporting can a®ect readers' moods and attitudes
while reading the paper and coming across its ads;14 for instance, a news-
paper report on animal rights can activate anti-cosmetics attitudes, so that
readers are unreceptive to ads of cosmetics companies (if believed to practice
animal testing); Baker (1994) and Bagdikian (2000) give consistent evidence
that advertisers often choose to avoid advertising alongside depressing re-
ports. Second, newspapers play a signi¯cant role in shaping their readers'
long-term attitudes and beliefs; for instance, when a newspaper frequently re-
ports on animal rights, pro-animal attitudes become chronically accessible to
its readers, again possibly reducing the e®ectiveness of advertising cosmetics
in that paper (see Chaiken et al., 1996); Cialdini (1993) directly emphasizes
the in°uential power of message repetition; Baker (1994) reports how Est¶ ee
Lauder declined to advertise in the magazine Ms., arguing that Ms. was not
13Allowing the opposite bias (rk > 1) makes no di®erence, as papers never want to go
against the tastes of both readers and advertisers. To study biased readers, rk = 1 could
instead represent readers' preferred bias. Note that if advertisers valued accuracy (t < 0),
they would then help de-bias news.
14We refer to Isen et al. (1978) and Forgas (1995) for psychological work on mood and
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) on attitude change, but the introductory quotation of Le Lay
provides a good caricature of the idea.
9portraying the sort of \kept-woman mentality" (Lauder's words) that Lauder
was trying to sell.
More speci¯cally, we assume advertisers make pro¯ts m per unit sold,
where m is the markup over unit cost. Let zi;j denote the expected quantity
of goods purchased by reader type i from advertiser j. Since reader i comes
across j's ad through paper n only if yj
n = 1, we can write
z


















where ¹ zi;j is an ad-independent component. The key assumption is that
advertising raises consumption, but to a lesser extent if the paper carrying the
ad contains a lot of reporting on sensitive topics.15 Notice that no consumer
reads the same ad twice (since each reader buys at most one paper), and
that we assume reporting intensity a®ects responsiveness to the ad in a linear
fashion. Advertisers get revenue from selling goods (whose prices we assume
to be ¯xed). Their production costs are implicit in the markup m, a ¯xed
cost F, and the advertising costs qj
nyj
n. We can thus write advertiser j's























































where ¹ z;j is the aggregated ad-independent component and we normalize the
markup m to 1. This implies the reduced form of Equation (1).
The accuracy interpretation of r has similar implications for advertiser
news preferences. For instance, when a newspaper's biased reporting induces
readers to under-estimate the risk of global warming,16 advertisers know that
15This assumption is also vindicated in an extension of Anderson and McLaren's (2005)
model with Bayes rational readers, provided readers do not know how much hard infor-
mation is available to the advertisers and newspapers.
16See DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) for a formal model analyzing how biased
reporting distorts people's beliefs when some readers are boundedly rational. Repetition
is key; see also Hawkins and Hoch (1992) on the \truth e®ect" in psychology.
10these readers are less likely to develop beliefs that cars are harmful; so biased
reporting can make readers more receptive to ads for cars, while accurate (or
unbiased) reporting reduces the advertising payo® of car manufacturers.
A third possible interpretation is that r represents the \complexity" or
\depth" of reporting. As suggested in the introductory quotation of Le Lay,
critical thinking may distract people from advertisements and therefore make
them less receptive to ads; see also Neisser (1979) for psychological evidence.
This view suggests that t would be positive on a very broad range of topics, so
we can use it to explain the general \dumbing down" of coverage mentioned in
the introduction. It could also generate a trend towards more entertainment
and super¯cial programming, but we suspect this factor is more relevant in
other media outlets, such as television.
The durable e®ects of news reporting on people's beliefs and attitudes
can explain why ¯rms and governments might also care about a newspaper's
reporting strategy independently of whether they advertise there. The news
strategy a®ects how readers respond to ads and opportunities encountered
elsewhere. In particular, it can a®ect how people vote and whether they
pressure for regulation of an industry or a monopolistic company. We analyze
these advertising-independent e®ects in Section 5.
3 Monopoly
In this section, we present the benchmark case of a monopoly newspaper
market (N = 1).17 Until the more general analysis of Section 7, we focus
on the case with one type of advertiser and one topic (J = K = 1) which
is of interest to all readers (si > 0 8i 2 I), but to which advertisers are
sensitive (t > 0). Our goal is to understand how the newspaper's equilibrium
reporting level varies with the importance (®) of advertising. Substituting
the advertising prices from Lemma 1 into the monopolist's objective function,
17An alternative benchmark for the case of two competing newspapers is that of a mo-
nopolist controlling two papers; we discuss this case below, but the single paper monopolist
proves to be the most relevant for our analysis in Section 5.









i(p;r)(1 ¡ tr) (3)
The ¯rst term represents reader revenue (from selling copies) and the second
term represents advertising revenue (from selling ad space). The tradeo®
in choosing r is straightforward: the paper pleases readers by raising r and
pleases advertisers (for a ¯xed readership) by lowering r; the only complica-







the minimal level of accuracy that enables a newspaper to retain type i
readers at p = 0.18
When ® = 0, the monopolist maximizes accuracy to please readers, but
when ® becomes large, the advertising revenue term dominates and the mo-
nopolist focuses on pleasing the advertiser; this drives accuracy downwards.
In the following simple example (repeated for the competitive context be-
low), the monopolist ends up lowering r to the minimal level that attracts
all readers. Note that in all the examples, we assume a 50:50 sharing rule
between newspaper(s) and advertisers, that is, ½ = 1
2.
Example 1 There are two reader types, (s1;b1) = (1; 3
8), (s2;b2) = (1
8;0),
and ® advertisers of type t = 1
2. When ® is small (® < 0:97), readers
determine accuracy; the paper selects maximal accuracy (r = 1) and sets a
copy price of p = 5
8. This extracts the full surplus from type 1 readers, while
type 2 readers are priced out of the market. As ® increases, the monopolist
starts to earn more from advertising and is increasingly tempted to please
advertisers by reducing r while increasing readership. When ® reaches 0:97,
the newspaper cuts r from 1 to 3
7 and simultaneously cuts p to 3
56 so that
all readers buy the paper. When ® reaches 4, the newspaper further reduces
18Recall that, except for Section 6, copy prices are always assumed to be nonnegative.
12accuracy to r = 3
8(= r1
min) and price to p = 0; again all readers buy. Since
it is impossible to further reduce accuracy without losing readers, this is the
equilibrium outcome for all ® large (® ¸ 4). See Figure 1. 2
The general case is similar. First, accuracy is always full when ® = 0,
since the monopolist then has no opportunity cost (lost advertising revenue)
of increasing accuracy and can extract at least part of the increased reader
surplus. Second, accuracy always falls, for su±ciently large ®, to the minimal
level ri
min needed to attract some reader i at p = 0, since the monopolist
eventually focuses on maximizing advertiser surplus, minimizing r subject to
retaining a su±cient audience for advertisers.19
Proposition 1 For ® su±ciently small, a monopolist reports fully accu-
rately, r = 1. For ® su±ciently large, it sets p = 0 and reduces accuracy
to the minimal level, r = r^ ¶
min < 1, su±cient to attract reader type ^ {, where
^ { = argmaxi2I ¼(0;ri
min).
An immediate corollary is that if all readers have zero reservation values
(bi = 0 8i 2 I), su±ciently large ® leads the monopolist to reduce accu-
racy to zero. In general, however, it faces a tradeo® between reducing r to
raise advertiser surplus per reader, and increasing r to increase readership.
For instance, if advertising from car and energy companies are su±ciently
important to a monopoly newspaper, the paper may under-report on global
warming or bias its environmental reports to suggest that risks are minimal.
Omitting this topic altogether, or biasing all reports to claim a zero risk, is
rare because such a paper would lose credibility. We capture this credibility
factor in the model through positive reservation values bi.
Of course, if people have no way to judge or detect the degree of bias,
papers can distort news arbitrarily and readers cannot reward papers for
accuracy. The model would then predict extreme bias r = 0 for any ® > 0,
19The alternative benchmark of a two paper monopolist is slightly di®erent: when ® is
low, such a monopolist may di®erentiate its papers to price discriminate, so even ® = 0
does not guarantee full accuracy for all readers; when ® is high, it may di®erentiate its
papers to lower the average of the accuracy levels accepted by readers, so advertising no
longer drives all prices to zero.
13but that is an extreme case. Readers usually have access to some external
sources of information. So, over time, they get at least some idea of the degree
to which newspapers under-report. Our assumption that readers observe r
perfectly captures this in an extreme way. Since advertisers have more at
stake, they will often learn to observe r more e®ectively than do (most)
readers. Introducing such a di®erence in observation of r would increase
the impact of advertising beyond that suggested by advertising's fraction of
newspaper revenue.
The simple lesson from Proposition 1 is that advertisers a®ect news con-
tent through a market price mechanism. There is no free-riding problem
among advertisers: they do not undersupply pressure for reducing r in the
hope that other advertisers will apply that pressure in their place. To see this
note that were advertisers able to agree on their strategies cooperatively in
stage 5, they would behave as a single advertiser of size a = ®, whose utility










Lemma 1 is then trivially adjusted: the paper would charge this advertiser









. Substituting a = ® reveals
that the monopolist's pro¯t function and hence reporting choice are exactly
as before.20
4 Duopoly
In this section we analyze duopoly newspaper markets (N = 2). (We retain
the above parametric assumptions.) We begin with the case of homogeneous
readers where competition for readers is so direct that papers give full accu-
racy regardless of ®. We then analyze how reader heterogeneity may permit
vertical di®erentiation (see the multi-topic case of Section 7 for horizontal dif-
ferentiation). In this setting, we derive our paradoxical result that increasing
the number or size of advertisers may actually improve the reporting accuracy
20Advertisers get a selective bene¯t from advertising in newspapers that under-reports,
so newspapers can implicitly charge advertisers for under-reporting. Reporting outcomes
would only change if collusion or size increased advertisers bargaining or commitment
power { see Section 5.
14of competing newspapers.
4.1 Homogeneous Readers
Reader homogeneity precludes market segmentation. Bertrand price-setting
generates perfect competition for readers, who therefore get what they want,
namely full accuracy at zero prices.
Proposition 2 For any ® > 0, in a duopoly with only one reader type, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium has full accuracy and zero prices, rn = 1
and pn = 0 for n = 1;2.
This full accuracy result is important because it shows how e®ective com-
petition can be in preventing bias. It follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the unique subgame per-
fect equilibrium of any subgame starting at a pro¯le of reporting strategies
(r1;r2), where r1 6= r2, has all readers going to the newspaper with the higher
level of accuracy.
Both the lemma and the proposition do depend on the homogeneity as-
sumption for small and intermediate values of ®, however, when ® is suf-
¯ciently large, this Bertrand-type competition and the lemma hold more
generally as we now show.
4.2 Heterogeneous Readers
With heterogeneous readers, advertising can have a non-monotonic e®ect on
accuracy in a duopoly. When ® is small, the newspapers di®erentiate their
reporting strategies to soften the price competition for readers. So increasing
® initially leads to lower accuracy as a monopolistic reaction by at least one
of the papers. However, when ® becomes su±ciently large, the value to each
paper of winning an additional reader is so high that market segmentation is
no longer possible. Intense competition for readers forces the papers to raise
accuracy to its maximal level (and set minimal copy price). We illustrate
15this non-monotonicity in the case with vertical di®erentiation by adding a
competing newspaper to Example 1. Then we generalize the example.
Example 2 This is identical to Example 1, except that now N = 2 instead of
1 (i.e., add one paper, so I = 2, J = K = 1; (s1;b1) = (1; 3
8), (s2;b2) = (1
8;0);
t = 1
2). For ® small (® < 0:97), the newspapers vertically di®erentiate their
reporting strategies to soften competition for readers. The high accuracy
newspaper is fully accurate and charges a higher price than its competitor.
Figure 2 shows how increasing ® initially leads the low accuracy paper to
reduce its accuracy to maintain market segmentation, and then, when ®
exceeds 0:5 to reduce its accuracy to zero to raise advertiser pro¯ts (the
local monopoly response). Then when ® gets too large (® ¸ 0:97), market
segmentation becomes impossible. (The accurate paper has an incentive to
compete for the low quality paper's readers.) In the intense competition for
readers that follows, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has newspapers
setting full accuracy and zero copy prices. 2
To generalize this example with vertical di®erentiation, we introduce a
notion of reader diversity.
De¯nition 1 Two reader types (si;bi) 2 [0;1]2, i = 1;2, are diverse if the
indi®erence curves yielding their respective reservation utility levels (b1 and
b2) intersect in (r;p) space at some r 2 (0;1] and p > 0. Two reader types
are strongly diverse if they are diverse and si ¡ bi > 2(s¡i ¡ b¡i) holds
either for i = 1;¡i = 2 or i = 2;¡i = 1.
The strong diversity condition (which is satis¯ed in Example 2) is su±-
cient to ensure that papers can segment the market for small ®.
Proposition 3 In a duopoly: (a) if there are two reader types and they
are strongly diverse, then for su±ciently small ®, subgame perfect equilibria
involve vertical di®erentiation, with at least one newspaper providing less
than full accuracy; (b) su±ciently large ® always leads to full accuracy and
zero prices in both papers.
16This result does not depend on the number of advertisers { the e®ect is
identical for the case with a single advertiser that gets very large; that is, one
can replace ® with a. So the result is somewhat paradoxical: increasing the
advertiser's size eventually leads to full accuracy even though the advertiser
prefers minimal accuracy. The competition intensity e®ect of advertising that
drives the result is straightforward and intuitive.21 Nonetheless, we now show
that the result is overturned when advertisers have su±cient commitment
power.
5 Advertisers Revisited
Many advertisers are su±ciently long-lived to build up reputations for with-
drawing their custom from \unfriendly" media outlets; see for instance, foot-
note 6 on Coca-Cola's rejection of NBC after NBC aired a critical documen-
tary. To ensure that the wasteful punishments (foregone advertising) only
occur out of equilibrium, advertisers usually get in contact with newspaper
editors during the editorial process; such contacts are usually informal but
see page 4 for the explicit Chrysler case. Advertisers may even tacitly coor-
dinate on a general business norm of avoiding media that are insu±ciently
business-friendly.
In this section, we analyze how advertisers can use such commitment
power to in°uence newspaper reporting. We motivate a simple model of this
commitment mechanism that captures in reduced-form the dynamic process
by which advertisers build commitment reputations (alongside newspapers
building reporting reputations). We then derive its implications and extend
the results to explain how any actor that represents a signi¯cant source of
media revenue (not just from advertising custom) can in°uence the media.
21The result is fundamentally about competition and not the number of papers: a mo-
nopolist owning two newspapers would minimize accuracy on both papers when advertising
gets su±ciently large (as in Section 3).
175.1 Adding Stage 0: Advertisers with Commitment
We now add a stage 0 (just before newspapers ¯x their reporting strategies)
at which advertisers can commit to withhold advertising custom from news-
papers that breach a given level of accuracy on a sensitive topic. This is the
natural threat strategy: at stage 0, each advertiser announces a cut-o® level
of accuracy ¹ rj, for j 2 J, which commits them to set yj
n = 0 if rn > ¹ rj. We
refer to this as the model with commitment.22 Our goal is to investigate
whether commitment can allow large advertisers to escape the competition
logic that led to full accuracy as ® or a ! 1 in the duopoly case.
Consider ¯rst a single advertiser of size a that sets ¹ r < 1. Lemma 1
is slightly adjusted, because now yj
n = 0 if rj
n > ¹ rj. For large a, there is
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the continuation game with rn = ¹ r and
pn = 0 for n = 1;2, because competition is intense for rn restricted to [0; ¹ r],
and deviating outside this range is dominated for large a, since it generates
zero advertising revenue.23 So, how will the advertiser set ¹ r? For a ¯xed
readership, the advertiser surplus is decreasing in ¹ r, hence the advertiser
minimizes ¹ r subject to the problem of satisfying ri
min for enough readers. In
the limit as a becomes large, reader pro¯ts become relatively insigni¯cant,
so the advertiser's tradeo® approaches that of the monopolist in Proposition
1.
When instead there is a large number (®) of advertisers of the same type,
advertisers face a minor coordination problem. If enough advertisers set the
optimal level of ¹ r, then the papers will accept this restriction and setting
r = ¹ r is optimal. However, if all other advertisers make weaker threats, the
papers will set r > ¹ r and the advertiser setting r = ¹ r will not advertise at
all. The advertisers e®ectively play an \assurance game" at stage 0. It is
22Alternative commitment models { e.g., direct negotiation with newspapers over r and
commitments that raise 1 ¡ ½ { also generate our key results. Newspaper-speci¯c cut-
o®s (¹ rj
n) do imply subtle changes, but are less plausible: advertisers often build (cut-o®)
reputations (¹ rj) relevant to the widest group (all newspapers) or even follow a norm (¹ r)
of avoiding all newspapers that contravene a generic \business-friendly" standard.
23There is also a subgame perfect equilibrium with rn = 1 and pn = 0 for n = 1;2, but
this is Pareto dominated for the newspapers (and for advertisers); so the outcome with
rn = ¹ r and pn = 0 is more plausible.
18Pareto optimal for them to all set r = ¹ r.
Proposition 4 For su±ciently large ® or a, in a duopoly with commitment,
there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with accuracy restricted as in the
monopoly case, rn = ¹ r = r^ ¶
min, n = 1;2, as in Proposition 1.
We ¯nd that advertisers' optimal cut-o®s gradually become more extreme
as the importance of advertising (® and a) grows. Our ongoing example
provides a useful illustration.
Example 3 Adding stage 0 to Example 2 generally has a negative impact
on accuracy. As ® increases, advertisers can make increasingly stringent de-
mands on newspapers. In particular, for low and intermediate ®, accuracy on
the high quality newspaper 1 is set at the optimal cut-o® level r = ¹ r =
2(2¡®)
4¡® ,
which may even fall below the monopoly level without cut-o®s. Market seg-
mentation now becomes impossible already at ® = 0:63, (again newspaper 1
has an incentive to deviate by charging lower prices), but instead of jumping
up to 1, r now goes to ¹ r = 0:81, and prices fall to zero. Accuracy on both
papers is now determined by r = ¹ r =
2(2¡®)
4¡® , (which coincides with the ex-




8, and stays there for all ® ¸ 1:54; newspaper prices stay at
zero. See Figure 3. 2
5.2 Other Channels of In°uence
As motivated at the end of Subsection 2.5, businesses and governments may
care about news reporting even when they are not advertising in a given














for each actor of type j, independent of whether it advertises (yj
n = 1) in paper
n (hence the absence of the price term qj
n). The advertising-independent
distaste vector T j 2 [0;1]K captures concerns such as politicians wanting to
19have news biased in their favor and large companies wanting to avoid criticism
that might generate regulatory pressure or damage their reputations. Even
if tj = 0, we ¯nd that actors of type j can in°uence news content if they are
su±ciently important.
The recent case of the largest Spanish electricity company, Endesa, is il-
lustrative. After a recent spate of reports in the Spanish newspaper, La Van-
guardia, criticizing Endesa's service quality and price, Endesa began paying
for a costly supplement in La Vanguardia. Observers claim that, while os-
tensibly a form of advertising, this is actually a hidden subsidy and it came
accompanied by a threat of withdrawal had La Vanguardia continued its
negative reporting. Our model captures their argument as follows: Endesa
subsidizes a supplement worth A to La Vanguardia (n) provided rn · ¹ r {
i.e., Endesa commits to set Yn = 0 if rn > ¹ r. Endesa's threat is as e®ec-
tive as that of an advertiser with surplus worth A
½ (2A for the 50:50 case) in
Proposition 4.
There are many ways to generate the subsidy A. The recent scandal of
a government report candidly discussing media in°uence by politicians in
Spain and Catalonia o®ers a useful case study. First, central and regional
governments make explicit subsidies (e.g., several major dailies receive very
large subsidies from the Treasury and Social Security). Second, mass sub-
scriptions generate an additional, hidden subsidy. For instance, the Catalan
News Agency that supplies news stories to TV and other media gets 40% of
its subscriptions from public institutions (compared to only 27% for clients
other than the Catalan Television Corporation). Cheap credit from public
(and private) institutions is the third main channel for e®ective subsidy.
Ownership, control rights (e.g., to appoint directors), and censorship are
more direct mechanisms of in°uence, but the subtlest forms of in°uence are
particularly problematic since they may go unnoticed. Our theoretical result
(Proposition 4) applies to this case and suggests that large media subsidies
may need to be regulated to prevent interference with the provision of accu-
rate news. Two further mechanisms that restrict news reporting are \°ak"
(newspapers are threatened by legal costs when sued) and the power of news
20sources (such as businesses, governments and o±cials) to control access to in-
formation; see Dyck and Zingales (2003). In all cases, the downward pressure
on reporting is particularly problematic when readers' willingness to pay for
news is less than its social value, as is common when readers have di±culty
assessing news quality and when information has a strong public good aspect
(e.g., in public elections, stock market decisions, stakeholder activism).
6 Negative Prices
For the sake of completeness, we here address the case where negative pricing
is feasible.24 By allowing newspapers to compete on a broader range of prices,
this averts the need to use accuracy when the competition for readers becomes
extreme. When advertisers are su±ciently important, newspapers focus on
pleasing advertisers by minimizing accuracy; their advertising revenue allows
them to set a negative price that \bribes" readers to buy their paper in place
of a more accurate rival one.
6.1 Monopoly
The possibility of negative pricing requires only a slight change in Proposi-
tion 1: increasing the importance of advertising now always leads a monop-
olist to reduce accuracy to zero; even when readers have positive reservation
values, it is pro¯t-maximizing to o®er them a negative price, rather than
raise accuracy.
Proposition 5 If a monopoly newspaper is able to o®er negative prices, then
when ® is su±ciently large, accuracy falls to zero and prices are just low
enough to attract all readers, r = 0 and p = minf¡b1;::: ;¡bIg · 0.
6.2 Duopoly
Allowing duopolists to charge unbounded negative prices, overturns the com-
petition paradox identi¯ed in Section 4. Competition for readers is just as
24Negative prices should not be taken literally; for example, they capture the e®ect of
bundling the newspaper with a valuable coupon.
21intense, but newspapers now can, and for su±ciently signi¯cant advertising
always will, compete for readers by lowering copy price instead of raising ac-
curacy. The reason is that the increase in advertising surplus from lowering
accuracy (used to subsidize the payments to readers) eventually dominates
the reader disutility from reduced accuracy. The newspaper with lower ac-
curacy therefore ends up winning all the readers. So Lemma 2 is inverted.
Lemma 3 For su±ciently large ®, in a duopoly with negative pricing, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of any subgame starting at a pro¯le of
reporting strategies (r1;r2), where r1 6= r2, has all readers going to the news-
paper with the lower level of accuracy.
As a result, intense competition now leads papers to minimize accuracy
at r = 0 and set (negative) prices that pass on advertising surplus to readers.
Proposition 6 For su±ciently large ®, in a duopoly with negative pricing,
all subgame perfect equilibria have zero accuracy and readers are subsidized,
rn = 0 and pn = ¡½® < 0, for n = 1;2.
The newspapers just break even in equilibrium, but accuracy is minimized
instead of maximized, so advertisers are much better o® than in the case
with bounded pricing. However, notice a major caveat: if using coupons
to attract readers involves distortions (in the sense that coupons cost more
to the paper than they are worth to the readers), it may become optimal
to compete on accuracy as well as negative prices. Indeed, the results of
Section 4 are reestablished if readers' values from coupon expenditures are
su±ciently concave.25
7 Multiple Topics and Advertiser Types
In this section we consider the cases of monopoly and duopoly in a market
with two reader types and two or more advertiser types and topics. To
25On the other hand, if attractive coupons induce readers to buy (and read) both news-
papers, each newspaper eventually acts monopolistically (and minimizes accuracy).
22simplify the boundary case analysis, we assume bi = 0, si
k > 0 and t
j
k < 1
for all i 2 I;k 2 K;j 2 J. It is then easy to prove that all our results
generalize to the case with multiple topics and advertiser types except that
heterogeneity of large advertiser types could potentially weaken the power of
cut-o® strategies.
7.1 Monopoly
The only di®erence here is a slight increase in realism in that, with multiple
topics, monopolists can charge a positive copy price at arbitrarily large ®,
provided important advertisers do not dislike all the topics. Proposition 1
generalizes to:
Proposition 7 If ®j is su±ciently small for all j 2 J, a monopolist reports
fully accurately on all topics, rk = 1 for all k 2 K . Since ri
min = 0 for
all i, the level of accuracy is zero on any topic disliked by su±ciently many
advertisers, rk = 0 if t
j
k > 0 for any j 2 J with ®j su±ciently large.
7.2 Duopoly
The multiple topic case permits horizontal as well as vertical di®erentiation;
market segmentation becomes even easier. However, it is unsustainable when
advertisers are large.


























advertiser type with (t1;t2;t3) = (0; 3
4;0). Horizontal di®erentiation occurs
for any ® < 0:83. Each paper specializes in reporting fully accurately on one
of the two topics (1 and 3) that particularly interest readers. In addition,
they also both report fully accurately on topic 2 (charging a monopolistic
price of 11
12) until ® reaches 0:5, and at ® = 0:5, they both cut accuracy on
topic 2 to zero (and cut p to 2
3) to raise advertising pro¯ts. When ® is large
(® ¸ 0:83), product di®erentiation is impossible and the papers report with
full accuracy on all topics and set zero prices.
23Adding stage 0, commitment by advertisers again permits them to grad-
ually force reporting on topic 2 down to zero while the market is segmented.
When it is no longer possible to sustain product di®erentiation, accuracy
(and the cut-o® levels set by the advertisers) jump up to ¹ r2 = 0:44 and
again gradually drop down to zero. Figure 4 presents the accuracy levels on
topic 2 in both cases; accuracy on topic 2 is generally below the level in the
no-commitment case. 2
Lemma 2 and Propositions 3 and 4 all extend.
Proposition 8 In a duopoly, if ®j is su±ciently large for some j 2 J, then
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has rn = 1 and pn = 0 for n = 1;2.
Any su±ciently important advertiser provokes a fully accurate subgame
perfect equilibrium, until we introduce advertiser commitment power.26 Suf-
¯cient importance of advertising then takes us back to the monopoly case
provided that the large advertisers share a common concern.
Proposition 9 In a duopoly with commitment, if there is one large adver-
tiser type, say j, (i.e., where ®j and ®j
®j0;j0 6= j, are all su±ciently large),
then there is a subgame perfect equilibrium where all papers set zero accuracy
on any topic disliked by the large advertiser, rk = 0 if t
j
k > 0.
In summary, the commonalities of large advertisers combine additively in
the results based on ad space pricing, but advertiser di®erences can inhibit
coordinated use of cut-o® threats.
26This result relies on the assumption that both readers have a single ideal point in
terms of reporting strategy, i.e., all readers prefer (possibly weakly) r = 1 to anything
else. For the more general, symmetric preferences, si;tj 2 [¡1;1]K;i 2 I;j 2 J, our
full accuracy equilibrium may not be subgame perfect and market segmentation may be
sustainable even with large ®. Similarly, one can escape Gabszewicz et al.'s (2001) pens¶ ee
unique convergence result. So, except for the fact that our model is linear rather than
quadratic, this framework generalizes both Gabszewicz et al. (2001) and Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005). We leave a fuller analysis to future research.
248 Concluding Remarks
Under the assumption of an unbiased readership, we developed two main
ideas. First, we saw how, even without commitment power, advertisers can
a®ect news reporting, because monopolistic newspapers appropriate a share
of advertising surplus and therefore internalize advertiser concerns; compet-
itive newspapers nonetheless report accurately in this setting. Second, we
saw how any actor generating substantial income for the newspaper can af-
fect news reporting if able to commit to withhold its custom or funding,
contingent on undesirable reporting.
Our theory has clear policy implications. First and foremost, it shows
how media competition can prevent harmful e®ects of advertising on news
reporting, thus contributing to the debate on optimal merger policy in the
media market (see e.g., Anderson and McLaren, 2005).27 Second, it indicates
that allowing governments and businesses to pay direct or indirect subsidies
to newspapers generates a serious risk of news bias.28 Third, it suggests
that regulators should be concerned by the growing prevalence of newspa-
pers that bundle their papers with coupons and gifts; bundling permits a
form of negative pricing that softens competition on reporting and therefore
reduces reporting quality in equilibrium. Finally, the analysis is relevant for
the debate on funding of public television, such as the BBC. Publicly-funded
stations do not need (and are often not allowed) revenues from advertising;
this would avoid the type of content distortions analyzed here. Future work
should extend and complete the model to tie down precise welfare implica-
tions from a consumer or electoral perspective.29
27This competitive market objective requires particular attention when newspapers need
advertising to cover their ¯xed costs; see Ferrando et al. (2004) and also Baker (1994),
Bagdikian (2000) and McChesney (2000) on how advertising may then lead to a concen-
trated media market.
28Those who argue that businesses should not be able to make ¯nancial contributions to
political parties (to avoid political in°uence) would support bans on newspaper subsidies
by a parallel logic.
29The notion that, from a welfare perspective, readers do not demand enough informa-
tion in a market setting is based on the standard view that an informed citizenry is a public
good. Anderson and McLaren (2005) o®er a formalization of this idea. StrÄ omberg's (2001
and 2004) theoretical and empirical analysis is also pertinent: politicians are more respon-
25As Glaeser (2004) points out, "Psychology...tells us that people are very
susceptible to in°uence...[but] it doesn't tell us what people will be told."
Our framework analyzes what papers will say to their readers. We show
that the answer depends on what the papers are selling beyond news: if
primarily selling ad space, they will supply ad-friendly news content, unless
competition for readers forces them to supply accurate news.
Clearly, the preferences of the agents and their actual impact on media
content are an empirical matter. Our results are consistent with the empiri-
cal study of Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006), but more precise tests are feasible.
Advertisers' induced news preferences are central to the ¯rst set of results
(where advertising generates bias in a pure market context with unbiased
readers and pro¯t-maximizing newspapers), so our framework suggests that
empirical work should estimate the sensitivity (and correlation) of adver-
tisers' preferences over the news that is bundled with their ads as well as
the ¯nancial value of ad contracts and the competitiveness of the newspa-
per market. Our second set of results (those based on advertisers' cut-o®
commitments) indicate the further need to measure all types of newspaper
\subsidy". Thanks to the growing empirical literature on the estimation
of media bias,30 we are optimistic that it will soon be possible to test our
speci¯c predictions and better evaluate the impact of advertising (and other
non-reader revenues) on actual media content.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. This follows immediately from our assumptions. 2
Proof of Example 1. Given any level of accuracy, r, the monopoly news-
paper has essentially three possible pricing strategies, namely, to charge the
highest price that attracts both readers, one reader, or no reader. One way
to compute the values of the example is to compute the optimal r for each
sive to voters with better access to news; newspapers cater most to the news interests of
the readers most valued by advertisers; see also Baker (1994) and Hamilton (2004).
30See Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) for two recent
examples.
26of the three cases as a function of ®, and then to see which level of r (with
corresponding price) maximizes pro¯ts, again as a function of ®. 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Reporting strategy r and copy price p are chosen
at stages 1 and 2 to maximize the continuation payo® ¼(p;r) de¯ned in
Equation (3). When ® = 0, we get full accuracy (r = 1), because marginally
raising r permits to raise p at a rate of at least mini2I si > 0 and has no cost.
As ® increases, raising r begins to have a cost, but as long as ® is small, the
bene¯ts from raising p dominate.
For large ®, we ¯rst prove that r = ri
min for some i 2 I . Suppose to the








for some pair of reader types, i1 and i2 with
consecutive values of rmin. By reducing r towards r
i1
min and reducing p by
maxi2I si times the reduction in r, the paper avoids losing any readers and
it increases its advertising revenue at the rate ½®t
PI
i=1 xi(p;r), while only
decreasing reader revenue at the rate maxi2I si PI
i=1 xi(p;r). Since ½;t > 0,
for su±ciently large ®, the gain in advertising revenue dominates the lost
reader revenue. This contradicts the optimality of the above r. The same
argument applies for r > maxi2Ifri
ming. Moreover, clearly r < mini2Ifri
ming
cannot be optimal since it would lead to zero pro¯ts, when positive pro¯ts
are possible. This proves the claim.
Now, given r = ri
min, if p > 0, reducing p to 0, strictly increases readership
by at least 1 (by de¯nition, the readers i with ri
min = r start buying when
p = 0) and this raises advertising revenue by at least ½®(1¡tr) which again
dominates the loss in reader revenue of
PI
i=1 pxi(p;r) for su±ciently large ®
(notice that 1 ¡ tr > 0 by the assumption in Subsection 2.4). The monop-
olist's pro¯ts are therefore given by ¼(0;ri
min) and i is chosen to maximize
this. Hence i = ^ { as stated. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, assume that at stage 1,
newspaper 2 sets r2 < r1, and sr1 > sr2 ¸ b (otherwise, if sr2 < b, there is no
demand for newspaper 2 in any continuation game, and the claim is trivially
true). We show that there is a unique SPE of this continuation game and
that newspaper 1 wins all the readers. Essentially, this follows as in standard
Bertrand competition, where both newspapers seek to undercut each other.
Here, since r2 < r1, for any price p2 ¸ 0, 1 can always win all readers by
27o®ering a price marginally below p2+s(r1¡r2) (the price at which the readers
are indi®erent between buying from 1 rather than buying from 2 at p2). In
particular, for any p2 ¸ 0, 1 can always ¯nd a price at which it wins all the
readers. This is not true for player 2: since prices are assumed nonnegative,
the lowest price 2 can charge is p2 = 0 and so, unless p1 > s(r1¡r2), 2 cannot
undercut 1. Hence 1 will set p1 · s(r1¡r2). Moreover, from sr2 ¸ b, we have
sr1¡b ¸ s(r1¡r2), which guarantees that buying at p1 is individually rational
for readers. Hence, if the inequality is strict and p1 < s(r1¡r2), 1 can always
increase pro¯ts by raising p1 marginally. It follows that p1 = s(r1 ¡ r2) and
p2 = 0 is the unique continuation SPE. Also, x1 = 1 here, because otherwise
1 would marginally reduce p1 to win over the 1 ¡ x1 remaining readers. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. If newspapers set r1 = r2, then Bertrand price
competition generates zero prices. If one paper sets a positive price, the
other paper can either set a higher price and get no readers, set the same
price and get some fraction of the readers, or win all the readers by setting a
lower price. Since a paper without readers makes no pro¯ts, and at least one
paper can sharply increase its readership and pro¯ts by setting a marginally
lower price than its competitor's, competition drives prices down to zero.
Using Lemma 2, given any pure strategy of, say, paper 1 with r1 < 1,
the other paper's response is to set r2 marginally higher, thus taking all the
readers and leaving 1 with no pro¯ts: if 2 sets r2 < r1, it gets no pro¯ts
whereas it is guaranteed positive pro¯ts if it sets r2 > r1. Furthermore,
r2 = r1 < 1 cannot be an equilibrium, because at least one paper could
marginally raise r and sharply increase its readership (and advertising pro¯ts
if ® > 0) and marginally increase reader revenue. The equilibrium with
r1 = r2 = 1 and zero prices is the only possible one, since given ® > 0 both
papers make pro¯ts (a positive number of readers leads to positive advertising
pro¯ts { we assume readers randomize when the papers are identical) and so
neither is willing to set a lower value of r since it would lead to zero readers
and zero overall pro¯ts. 2
Proof of Example 2. The proof closely follows that of Proposition 3 below.
For ® small, papers set accuracy levels (r1;r2) = (1; 6¡2®
7 ); the decreasing
level of r2 re°ects the fact that it is increasingly tempting for paper 1 to
28compete with paper 2 and segmentation can only be sustained at a lower
level of accuracy of the low quality paper 2. As ® continues to increase,
it becomes increasingly attractive for paper 2 to decrease accuracy until at
® = 0:5 it is better o® setting r2 = 0 and p2 = 0, and deriving all pro¯ts
from advertising while still attracting type 2 readers. Since r2 = 0 now, a
segmentation equilibrium is easier to sustain and paper 1 can extract the
full surplus from high type readers. However, as ® continues to increase, 1
is further tempted to decrease accuracy in order to capture higher revenues
from advertising. Going through all the possible deviations of paper 1, it can
be veri¯ed that, from ® = 0:97 on, segmentation is no longer sustainable,
and the only SPE is the fully competitive one (with full accuracy and zero
prices). 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (a). Suppose ® = 0 and readers are strongly
diverse with, say, (¤) s1 ¡ b1 > 2(s2 ¡ b2). We will refer to type 1 readers
as the high types and type 2 readers as the low types. The general idea
of the segmentation equilibrium is that one of the newspapers targets the
high reader types with higher accuracy and higher prices, while the other
paper mostly targets low reader types with lower accuracy and lower prices.
More speci¯cally, we claim that there exists ^ r < 1 such that (r1;r2) = (1; ^ r)
and conversely (r1;r2) = (^ r;1), are the only pure SPE reporting outcomes.
To show this, we ¯rst characterize the SPE of the continuation game given
such a pro¯le (1; ^ r) or (^ r;1), and then prove that none of the papers have an
incentive to deviate in the ¯rst stage. (It is easy to see that if both papers
set r < 1, the one with higher r always has an incentive to raise r.) Without
loss, we consider (1; ^ r) and refer to paper 1 as the high quality paper and to
paper 2 as the low quality paper.
Recall that sir¡bi¡p = 0 de¯nes reader i's indi®erence curve at which i
is indi®erent between buying a paper of accuracy r at price p and not buying
any paper; sir¡bi is also the highest (individually rational) price at which i is
still willing to buy a paper of accuracy r, i = 1;2. By linearity, the diversity
condition implies that these two indi®erence curves intersect in (r;p)-space at
some (r0;p0) 2 (0;1)2. Suppose now that the low quality paper sets accuracy
r0 while the other sets accuracy 1. By (¤) if the low quality paper charges
29p0, then the high quality paper is not interested in competing for low reader
types, moreover, the low quality paper's subgame perfect continuation payo®
is p0 = s2r0 ¡ b2, since it exactly wins all the low types when it charges p0.
(Notice that, at such a pro¯le (1;r0), the continuation SPE involves a mixed
strategy pricing equilibrium, where paper 2 charges prices on the interval
[
p0
2 ;p0], while paper 1 charges prices on the interval [s1 ¡b1 ¡
p0
2 ;s1 ¡b1].) It
follows that in the ¯rst stage, while the high quality paper will set accuracy
equal to 1, the low quality paper will want to increase its accuracy level above
r0 up to the point where the high type paper starts to compete for low type
readers. This occurs at r2 = ^ r. We characterize ^ r and the continuation SPE
and then show that paper 2 does not want to increase r2 beyond this level.
To de¯ne ^ r, consider the high type reader indi®erence curve through the
point (1;2(s2 ¡ b2)) 2 [1] £ (0;1); by assumption this curve is to the south-
east of the curve s1r ¡ b1 ¡ p = 0, and any point on it is strictly better (for
the high type readers). Let (^ r; ^ p) denote the point in (r;p)-space at which
this curve intersects the low type readers' curve s2r ¡ b2 ¡ p = 0. Again, by
assumption, we have (^ r; ^ p) 2 (0;1)2 and ^ r > r0. (It is easy to check that
^ p = s2^ r ¡ b2 and ^ r =
s1¡2s2+b2
s1¡s2 .) The point (^ r; ^ p) has the characteristic that
it involves the highest level of accuracy of the low quality paper such that
if it charges the price ^ p = s2^ r ¡ b2 the other (high quality) paper is exactly
indi®erent between charging 2(s2 ¡ b2) and serving type 1 readers alone or
charging s2 ¡ b2 and serving both types of readers. (Notice that the points
(1;2(s2 ¡ b2)) and (1;s2 ¡ b2) lie on the indi®erence curves of respectively
type 1 and 2 readers through (^ r; ^ p).)
We now characterize continuation SPE following (1; ^ r). By construction,
paper 2 will not set a price higher than ^ p since it would lose the low type
readers; consequently paper 1 will not set a price above 2(s2¡b2) since it will
lose the high type readers. Furthermore, paper 2 will not set a price below
^ p=2 since it can make at most 2(^ p=2) = ^ p if it gets all readers at ^ p=2, while
it can guarantee the same amount by serving only low type readers at that
^ p (notice that, again by construction, paper 1 is not interested in competing
with paper 2 for low type readers); consequently paper 1 will not set a price
below 2(s2 ¡ b2) ¡ ^ p=2. The supports of the continuation equilibrium are
30thus contained in [2(s2 ¡ b2) ¡
^ p
2;2(s2 ¡ b2)] and [
^ p
2; ^ p] for papers 1 and 2
respectively. Since paper 1 is competing to retain high reader types and is
never competing for low reader types, while paper 2 is competing for high
reader types while always serving low reader types, the expected payo®s are
2(s2¡b2)¡^ p=2 for paper 1 and ^ p for paper 2. The mixed strategy equilibrium

















which must hold for all (p1;p2) in the intervals mentioned and can in turn be
unambiguously solved for paper 1 and 2's respective distribution functions
over prices, F1 and F2. (Using ^ p = s2^ r ¡ b2, the above equations lead to
F1(p1) = 2 ¡
s2^ r ¡ b2
p1 ¡ s1(1 ¡ ^ r)
and F2(p2) = 1 ¡
s2(4 ¡ ^ r) ¡ 3b2
2(p2 + s1(1 ¡ ^ r))
;
holding for (p1;p2) on the interior of the intervals de¯ned above, which using
^ r =
s1¡2s2+b2
s1¡s2 can be further solved to obtain overall distribution functions
and which may contain mass points at the boundary of the intervals.) In
summary, the pro¯le (1; ^ r) leads to a continuation equilibrium with payo®s
of 2(s2 ¡ b2) ¡
^ p
2 and ^ p to papers 1 and 2 respectively.
It remains to show that paper 2 has no incentive to increase its level
of accuracy. Suppose it does, then a new type of mixed strategy pricing
equilibrium follows, where paper 1 competes for the low reader types (this
follows from the construction of ^ r). This is turn leads to decreasing payo®s
for paper 2, since it can no longer guarantee the low type readers at s2r2¡b2,
and instead only obtains a payo® of x(r2) < ^ p (whenever r2 > ^ r), obtained














The point (r2;x(r2)) plays an analogous role to (^ r; ^ p) in that, when paper 2
charges x(r2) at r2, paper 1 is indi®erent between serving high reader types or
31competing for both reader types at half the price and a related mixed strategy
pricing equilibrium can be constructed. (Notice however that now the mixed
equilibrium involves paper 1 mixing on two disjoint intervals, namely, around
a high price that only attracts high reader types and around a lower price
attracting both reader types.)
Finally, for ® > 0 su±ciently small, the same logic goes through due to
the continuity of the papers' payo®s in ®.
Part (b). As ® increases further, the incentive to capture all readers
increases. The segmentation equilibrium in (a) eventually becomes unsus-
tainable, because for su±ciently large ®, the paper with higher r would want
to compete to take all the readers. Once segmentation is ruled out, there
is no equilibrium with r1 6= r2, because in such equilibria the low r paper
makes zero pro¯ts by the same logic as in Lemma 2. Furthermore, because
all elements in the support of the equilibrium distribution over levels of accu-
racy must have equal expected payo®, there are no mixed strategy equilibria
involving positive mass on levels of accuracy below 1. Hence, the unique SPE
has r1 = r2 = 1 and zero prices as in Proposition 2. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. Given any ¹ r 2 [0;1] and ® su±ciently large, there
is a SPE with rn = ¹ r, n = 1;2 and zero prices. By setting r > ¹ r, a paper
gets all the readers, but even the full reader surplus is less than the
½
2 of the
advertising surplus guaranteed from getting half the readers at ¹ r . This is
the unique continuation equilibrium given ¹ r, because lower rn's are ruled out
by the logic of Lemma lemma:bert. With ® su±ciently large, the advertisers
choose ¹ r to maximize their surplus ((1¡½)
P
i2I xi
n(0; ¹ r)(1¡t¹ r)) at r^ ¶
min, since
the monopolist's objective at (¹ r;0) only di®ers by
½®
1¡½ times the advertiser
surplus . Notice that in the limit, the equilibrium of this proposition Pareto
dominates all the other ones for both advertisers and newspapers. 2
Proof of Example 3. The proof is as with Example 2, except now optimal
cut-o®s need to be computed. At ® = 0 we have the same situation as in Ex-
ample 2, but this changes as soon as ® is positive. The advertiser can choose
to bound the level of accuracy and computes the lowest level of accuracy r
that makes paper 1 indi®erent between choosing r1 with the corresponding
continuation SPE with no revenues from advertising, and a strategy r with
32corresponding continuation SPE and revenues from advertising. This gives
the downward sloping curve r =
2(®¡2)
®¡4 which is also the level of accuracy
paper 1 chooses; paper 2 chooses a similar strategy as in Example 2. Further,
as ® increases, paper 1 is increasingly tempted to lower its level of accuracy
to capture more advertising revenues, and, already at ® = 0:63, the segmen-
tation equilibrium is no longer sustainable. From here, the only equilibrium
is again the fully competitive one, where now the level of accuracy is bound
by the cut-o® level set by the advertiser. That bound is determined by the
condition that none of the papers have an incentive to set accuracy to 1 to
capture all readers and make revenues from readers alone through high ac-
curacy. This gives the same downward sloping curve r =
2(®¡2)
®¡4 as above.
Finally, as this bound reaches r = 3
8 (at ® = 1:54), it can no longer decrease,
since type 1 readers would otherwise be lost. Hence, from ® = 1:54 on, the
competitive equilibrium entails rn = 3
8, n = 1;2, which is the same level of
accuracy set by the monopolist (for large ®) but here at zero prices. 2
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is similar to the case of Proposition 1
with the di®erence that now a monopolist can set negative prices. It is
now possible to lower r to 0 and retain all the readers by setting a price of
p = minf¡b1;::: ;¡bIg · 0. For large ®, the bounded cost (¡p) of attracting
readers in this way is worth paying, because the advertising surplus even on
just one reader is so high. Furthermore, the marginal reduction in reader
subsidy permitted by a marginal increase in r is dominated by the loss in
advertising surplus. Thus, for ® su±ciently large, the paper will set r = 0
and set p = minf¡b1;::: ;¡bIg · 0 so as to capture all readers. At this
price all readers either strictly or weakly prefer to read the newspaper and
newspaper pro¯ts are given by (½® + p)I À 0 8 large ®.2
Proof of Lemma 3. Without loss of generality, assume that at stage 1,
newspapers set r2 < r1, and sr1 > sr2 ¸ b as before. In stark contrast to
Lemma 2, we show that newspaper 2 now wins all the readers. This follows
by Bertrand competition with the important di®erence that now prices are
not bounded from below. Newspapers continue to undercut each other as
long as they can make positive pro¯ts. Since s > 0, the newspaper with the
lower level of accuracy (here paper 2) is the one that can win the readers,
33because its greater advertising \subsidy" dominates the reader disutility from
its accuracy de¯cit. More precisely, let p
n(rn) denote the lowest price paper
n with accuracy rn can charge (as monopolist) and break even. (Notice that
p
n(rn) = ¡½®(1¡trn).) Clearly, neither paper will ever charge a lower price,
and, since r2 < r1, we have p
2(r2) < p
1(r1)(< 0). Moreover, for ® su±ciently
large, for any p1 ¸ p
1(r1), paper 2 can always gain by undercutting paper 1
by just enough to take the entire market. This is not the case for newspaper
1. In the unique continuation SPE, newspaper1 competes as far as it can
by setting p1 = p
1(r1) and newspaper 2 wins the whole market x2 = 1, by
setting p2 = p1 ¡ s(r1 ¡ r2) { x2 must equal 1, otherwise paper 2 would
marginally reduce p2 to win over the 1 ¡ x2 remaining readers.2
Proof of Proposition 6. If newspapers both set r = r1 = r2, then Bertrand
price competition will lead to zero pro¯ts and to all papers being sold at the
lowest sustainable price, namely, p(r) equals the lowest price a newspaper
with r = r1 = r2 can charge and break even (this coincides with p
1, p
2 of
Lemma 3 where now p(r) = p
1(r) = p
2(r) = ¡½®(1 ¡ tr)). This is true
regardless of how demand is split between two papers that charge the same
price. A paper selling at a price higher than p(r) can be pro¯tably undercut.
Using Lemma 3, (and parallel to Proposition 3(b)), given any pure strat-
egy of, say, paper 1 with r1 > 0, the other paper's response is to set r2
marginally lower, thus taking all the readers and leaving 1 with no pro¯ts.
Furthermore, r2 = r1 > 0 cannot be an equilibrium, because either paper
could marginally decrease its accuracy and sharply increase readership and
revenues (since ® large). Again, because all elements in the support of the
distribution must have the same expected payo®, there are no mixed equi-
libria with positive mass on accuracy levels rn > 0, n = 1;2. Hence the
equilibrium with r1 = r2 = 0 and prices p1 = p2 = p(0) = ¡½® is the only
possible one. 2
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is almost exactly as in Proposition
1, because we can study variations in rk for a single topic at a time. The
multiple advertiser types pose no problem for the results about large ®j
because reducing rk weakly raises revenue from all advertiser types. However,
the zero price result would no longer hold if we allowed there to be some
34topics k that are not disliked by any large advertisers (i.e., t
j
k = 0 for all the
advertisers j with ®j ! 1). 2
Proof of Example 4. The proof follows from analogous computations to
the ones of Examples 2 and 3. (Detailed proofs are available from the authors
upon request.) 2
Proof of Proposition 8. This result extends Proposition 3(b). The idea of
the proof is very similar. Take a stage 1 pro¯le (r1;r2) · 1 with r1;r2 6= 1, (r1
and r2 are now vectors), and suppose without loss that the subgame perfect
continuation payo® for newspaper 1 is greater or equal to that of newspaper
2. We show that 2 then has an optimal deviation to set r0
2 ¸ r1 with r0
2 6= r1
(for any ® > 0). So the two papers drive accuracy up to rn = 1 in any
subgame perfect equilibrium. To see this, ¯x r1 · 1 with r1 6= 1 and consider
























since ¹ rj = 1 and tj 2 [0;1)K, j 2 J. The numbers of readers are characterized
by the following lemma, which extends Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 If, under the assumptions of Proposition 8, we have r0
2 ¸ r1 and
r0










To see this, notice that because there are no reservation values
for readers and si
k > 0 for all k 2 K;i 2 I, newspaper 2 can
attract all the readers by charging su±ciently low prices. Since
®j is large for at least one advertiser, it will be in newspaper 2's
interest to charge a lower price to capture all the readers. 2
Now, given r1, if newspaper 2's continuation payo® at r2 is less than
or equal to newspaper 1's payo®, 2 would gain by deviating to some r0
2
su±ciently close to r1 with r0
2 ¸ r1 and r0
2 6= r1. This gives almost the same
advertising pro¯ts as paper 1 scaled up by the total number of readers divided
35by the original number of readers of paper 1; the scale factor exceeds unity
and advertising revenues dominate reader revenues; paper 2 would be getting
more than paper 1 had. Hence there is no subgame perfect equilibrium with
either rn · 1 and rn 6= 1. To see that the pro¯le (rn;pn) = (1;0), n = 1;2, is
part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, notice that by Lemma 4, newspapers
cannot have a pro¯table deviation by changing the level of accuracy since they
would get zero readers and hence zero pro¯ts. At r1 = r2 = 1, prices charged
in stage 2 will again be zero, as the argument of the proof of Proposition 2
(see second paragraph) applies here as well. 2
Proof of Proposition 9. Under the stated assumptions, one can e®ectively
neglect all but one advertiser. This result immediately extends Proposition 4.
The proof uses Proposition 8 (in place of Proposition 3) to verify that r = ¹ rj
and zero pricing constitutes the unique SPE for su±ciently large ®j. 2
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Example 2 : Duopoly accuracy Hsolid linesLand reader prices Hdashed linesL

















Example 3 : Duopoly accuracy Hsolid linesLand reader prices Hdashed linesL with cutoffs

















Example 4 : Duopoly accuracy on topic 2 withoutcutoffs Hsolid lineL
and with cutoffs HdashedlineL
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